A Transitional Arrangement
Suryanarayana remarks that this argument can be traced to 1963 when China signed a temporary boundary agreement with Pakistan. On that occasion, China noted that the accord could be renegotiated by the eventual sovereign authorities who would have ownership of J&K following a settlement between India and Pakistan.
However, with India and Pakistan unable to agree so far, the Sino-Pakistani “Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation”, signed in 2005, is also materially relevant now. Following the Treaty, Islamabad began viewing China implicitly as a protector of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This aspect apparently covers the disputed CPEC areas, although there is no official confirmation. Until now, the ground realities of the unsettled boundaries between China and India as well as India and Pakistan have remained complex.
The China-India Treaty Proposal
Through various mechanisms, India and China seek to safeguard the undemarcated Line of Actual Control along their disputed boundary on a daily basis. As for India and Pakistan, a Line of Control (LoC) divides J&K between them.
In the high-altitude glaciated zone not covered by the LoC, there is a constant military confrontation between India and Pakistan at the Siachen-Saltoro Range. Close to this glaciated area is the Shaksgam Valley which Pakistan had ceded to China. Both China and India claim this valley.
In this overarching situation, Luo emphasised on 4 April 2019 the need for China and India themselves to negotiate and sign a “Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation”. He re-emphasised this proposal before becoming Vice Minister in June. While not being a Sino-Indian boundary agreement, the proposed Treaty, if explored by Xi and Modi, can serve a creative strategic purpose.
Delhi can seek a binding bilateral commitment from Beijing to the effect that the CPEC does not legitimise Islamabad as the sovereign owner of the areas in dispute between India and Pakistan. Such a binding commitment from Beijing will harmonise its stated position on the CPEC with Delhi’s stand on the Pakistan-administered but disputed portion of this corridor.
A Win-Win-Win Strategic Option
If Beijing reassures India in such a binding fashion, the strategic climate for enhanced Sino-Indian economic engagement will surely improve. India can win through its participation in the BRI and/or greater trade with China. In the process, China, too, will win greater access to the burgeoning Indian market through collateral Free Trade Agreement, also proposed by Luo.
For Pakistan, the net benefit will be the easing of the strategic uncertainty over the CPEC’s future in the face of India’s current opposition. While this does not immediately solve the India-Pakistan dispute over the final status of J&K, the strategic climate for the search of a political settlement will surely improve.
In this way, the current distrust between India and China may begin to dissipate, insofar as the Chinese affinity with Pakistan over the CPEC is concerned. However, China and India will be able to build bilateral trust only by strengthening their existing confidence-building matrix and by making progress towards their long-pending boundary settlement.
Therefore, the Sino-Indian Good-Neighbourliness Treaty and the collateral FTA, as proposed by Luo, deserve to be explored. At the same time, notes Suryanarayana, both India and Pakistan cannot wish away the reality of each being a significant factor in China’s emerging strategic priorities in this trilateral neighbourhood.
Image Courtesy: CFR, CNN, The Daily Star
(DIDHITI GHOSH is an India Columnist at La Agencia Mundial de Prensa, USA, and is the Bureau Chief of Indian Observer Post based in Kolkata. E-mail: didhiti.24@gmail.com | LinkedIn: https://bit.ly/2H6gNAv).